McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystems are robust and versatile cryptosystems. These cryptosystems work with any linear error-correcting codes. They are popular these days because they can be quantum-secure. In this paper, we study the Niederreiter cryptosystem using quasi-cyclic codes. We prove, if these quasi-cyclic codes satisfy certain conditions, the corresponding Niederreiter cryptosystem is resistant to the hidden subgroup problem using quantum Fourier sampling. Our proof requires the classification of finite simple groups.
Introduction
In last couple of decades, modern view of the theory of computer science has taken huge leap due to advances in quantum computing. First significant impact of quantum computing was in 1995 with Shor's factoring algorithm [27] . This quantum algorithm could factorize numbers in polynomial time. This breaks RSA. Soon this algorithm was extended for the discrete logarithm problem. This triggered post-quantum cryptography.
All the algorithms mentioned above, the factoring algorithm, solving the discrete algorithm problem are instances of the hidden subgroup problem. Roughly speaking, hidden subgroup problem is an instance where a function hides a subgroup and our task is to recover the subgroup. Quantum computing gives a solution to this problem via quantum Fourier sampling (QFS) when the parent group is commutative. So far, not much progress has been made in the hidden subgroup problem for non-commutative groups. In this paper, we look at one such cryptosystem, a code based Niederreiter cryptosystem using quasi-cyclic codes.
The idea of (in)effectiveness of QFS was introduced by Kempe and Shalev [18] , where they characterized subgroups in permutation groups that can be distinguished from the identity subgroup via a quantum Fourier sampling. This idea gave way of showing that some subgroups can not be distinguished from the identity subgroup and hence a hidden subgroup problem can not be solved by QFS. Dinh et. al. [7] , used this to show that McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystems resist QFS for goppa codes followed by Kapshikar and Mahalanobis [16] . We prove similar result for a large class of quasi-cyclic codes (QCC). Our main theorem is the following:
Theorem A (Main Theorem). For quasi-cyclic codes, which satisfy conditions (i) -(v) in Section 4.1, the corresponding Niederreiter cryptosystems resists quantum Fourier sampling attack.
Our proof can be divided up into 3 parts. Let H be the parity-check matrix of size k × n to be used in the Niederreiter cryptosystem. We write H = [I|C], where C is a block matrix with each block a circulant matrix of size p over a proper extension of F 2 for some prime p.
A) First we show that for any codes, the hidden subgroup problem over (GL k (F 2 ) × S n ) 2 ⋊ Z 2 can be broken down into GL k (F 2 ) and S n with an additional overhead in terms of the size of the hidden subgroup. Note that this decomposition into individual components is true for any error correcting code. It can be useful for other codes as well.
B) In the second part we use the structure of quasi-cyclic codes to find some important bounds. Here we also show, for our codes, the hidden subgroup is contained in S k × S n . C) We finish by combining the above arguments with some important results from the theory of permutation groups to show that the hidden subgroup can not be distinguished from the identity subgroup. Hence the Niederreiter cryptosystem thus constructed will be resistant to quantum Fourier sampling. This part uses the classification of finite simple groups.
A quick survey
Niederreiter or McEliece cryptosystems were not so popular. The main reason for this is large key sizes and in some cases low transmission rates. Various attempts were made to decrease key sizes. Many of them were later broken down with one or the other attack but the original McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystem is still believed to be secure. Balsdi and Chairaluce [3] suggested implementation of QC-LDPC codes for McEliece cryptosystem. Later similar construction based on QC-MDPC [23] was also recommended. Guo et. al. [12] presented a reaction attack on QC-MDPC. Later similar attack was also presented on QC-LDPC [9] . Other than these, there are other notable attempts by Monico et. al. [2, 24] including a recent work by Li et. al. [21] . For more information on the use of quasi-cyclic LDPC matrices in code based cryptosystem we refer to [1] and NIST round 1 proposals. Other than these, there are broadly two major general classical attacks on code based cryptography which fall under ISD (information set decoding). One of them is based on Stern's strategy [28] which was later improved by Bernstein et. al. [5] and other attack is due to Lee and Brickell [20] . For more on code based cryptography and attacks on it, we refer the reader to two NIST submissions for post-quantum cryptography [4, 30] .
Structure of the paper
In Section 2, we introduce briefly the standard method for quantum Fourier sampling and associated hidden subgroup problem along with a result by Kempe and Shalev [17, 18] . In the following section, we briefly talk about code based cryptosystems and in particular the Niederreiter cryptosystem. We also mention the main quantum attack the scramblerpermutation attack and its connection to the hidden subgroup problem which is a main objective of this paper. Then we move to the main contribution of this paper -proof of Theorem A. This paper is based on the work of Kempe and Shalev [17, 18] . Similar work was also done by Dinh et al. [7] and Kapshikar and Mahalanobis [16] .
The hidden subgroup problem
One of the unifying theme in quantum computing is the hidden subgroup problem. Most of the practical algorithms that offer exponential speedup in quantum computer science can be modeled in this form. Popular examples are, factoring integers by Shor's algorithm, the discrete logarithm problem and others [13] .
Definition 2.1 (Hidden Subgroup Problem). Let G be a group and H be a (unknown) subgroup of G. We are given a function f from G such that f (g 1 ) = f (g 2 ) whenever g 1 H = g 2 H. The function in this case is said to be separating cosets of the subgroup H.
The hidden subgroup problem is to find a set of generators of H.
The hidden subgroup problem is easy to solve when the group G is abelian but for non-commutative groups it is far from realized. Efforts to solve the hidden subgroup problem can be broadly characterized into two categories. One of which is based on a generalization of quantum Fourier sampling from abelian to non-abelian groups [14, 26] . The second direction is on some particular non-abelian black-box groups where instead of doing quantum Fourier transform over the group, it is done on the abelian group [15, 29] . Apart from this, some strong structural results are available in the non-commutative case, see Vazirani [10] . In this paper, we follow the first approach and our indistinguishability depends on the quantum Fourier transforms on non-abelian groups. The function for the Fourier transform is given by an irreducible representation over the field of complex numbers. Thus our Fourier transforms are matrix valued. In the case of abelian groups, the Fourier transforms were scalar valued.
Quantum Fourier Sampling
The algorithms based on QFS were developed based on the standard method by Simons and Shor [27] . We roughly sketch the process. The quantum Fourier sampling is based on a unitary transformation defined as follows:
. A quantum Fourier transform takes an element of the group algebra C[G] to the representation basis or the Fourier basis for group G.
where ρ is an irreducible representation of G and d ρ is its dimension.
The standard method for QFS is the following: initialise the state in superposition of all states in the first register and |0 in the second register. Apply f (where f (x, 0) = (x, f (x))). This is followed by measurement on the second register which puts the state of the first register in a random left coset of a subgroup H i.e., |gH = h∈H |gh for a random g. Finally QFT along with the measurement in the Fourier basis, gives the probability distribution as
(1)
As we have chosen g randomly and uniformly, P H = 1 |G| g P gH . To solve the hidden subgroup problem, one finds H in poly(log(|G|)) time. To distinguish H from the identity subgroup e , it is necessary that L 1 -distance between P H , P e is greater than some inverse polynomial in log(|G|). Thus one says that H is distinguishable from e if there exists a constant c such that D H := P H − P e 1 ≥ (log |G|) −c . Otherwise, we say that H is not distinguishable from e . So, if for all constants c, H and e have L 1 -distance smaller then (log(|G|)) −c , we say that H is not distinguishable from the identity subgroup. For more on this we refer to Kempe and Shalev [18] . It is well known that
where C i is a non-identity conjugacy class of G and h G denotes conjugacy class of h in G. So, by showing D H is less than every inverse polynomial in log(|G|) one can show that, QFS can not successfully reveal the hidden subgroup H. This is how we proceed in this paper, building on the work on Kempe and Shalev [18] .
Code based cryptosystems
There is a natural association between coding theory and cryptography because coding theory is a source of many computationally hard problems. More importantly, it is one of the promising areas in post-quantum cryptography as the underlying structures is noncommutative. As mentioned earlier, Shor-like algorithms, that are based on QFS are very effective over abelian groups. So, cryptosystems based on non-commutative groups are thought to be potential candidates for post-quantum cryptography.
One of the earliest cryptosystems based on error correcting codes was by McEliece [22] . A similar cryptosystem was proposed by Niederreiter [25] . Later, a signature scheme based upon Niederreiter systems was also presented. Our cryptosystem is a Niederreiter cryptosystem, based on quasi-cyclic codes.
Niederreiter cryptosystems
Let H be a k × n parity-check matrix for a [n, n − k] linear code C with a fast decoding algorithm. Let e be the number of errors that C can correct. Private Key:
Let X be a n-bit plaintext with weight at most e. The corresponding ciphertext Y of k-bits is obtained by calculating Y = H ′ X T .
Decryption:
Compute
Using Gaussian elimination find a z with weight at most e and Hz T = y. Since y =
Now use fast decoding on z with H to get X B T 0 and recover X .
Scrambler-Permutation Attack
Scrambler-permutation attacks are defined as, given H and H ′ , find A and B. Note that any A, B that satisfying H ′ = AHB breaks the system. Quantum computers, in principle, can exploit this attack. This follows from the fact that scrambler-permutation attacks can be reduced to a hidden subgroup problem. As we saw in previous sections, hidden subgroup problem is important because quantum computers have an advantage over classical computers for this class of problems over abelian groups. To illustrate the reduction to hidden subgroup problem, we first define a problem that is very close to the hidden subgroup problem. Definition 3.1 (Hidden shift problem). Let f 0 , f 1 be two functions from group G to some set X such that: there is a g 0 such that for all g, f 0 (g) = f 1 (g 0 g). The hidden shift problem is to find one such g 0 .
One can frame the scrambler-permutation attack as a hidden shift problem over G =
Moreover, it is known that for any non-commutative group G, a hidden shift problem can be reduced to a hidden subgroup problem on G 2 ⋊ Z 2 where the action of 1 on (x, y) is (y, x). In this paper we are interested in the particular case of G = GL k (F 2 ) × S n . For that we refer to Dinh et. al. [7, Proposition 3] , we use their notations for important subgroups for easy reference. The hidden subgroup is
where
Note that from now on wards we will use H for H 0 . Thus to break a Niederreiter cryptosystem using QFS, one needs to solve a hidden subgroup problem over G 2 ⋊ Z 2 for the hidden subgroup K. From our previous discussion it follows, if one shows that K is indistinguishable from the identity subgroup, then QFS can not solve the required hidden subgroup problem. For an understanding of indistinguishability we refer to Kempe and Shalev [18] .
Niederreiter cryptosystems and Quasi-Cyclic Codes
In this section we describe our Niederreiter cryptosystem which uses quasi-cyclic error correcting codes (QCC). Quasi-cyclic codes are a generalization of cyclic codes, codes where code-words are closed under right shifts. Since quasi-cyclic codes are a generalization of cyclic codes they can be expressed as nice algebraic objects. For more on QCC we refer Gulliver [11] and for algebraic structures of these codes to the work of Lally and Fitzpatrick [19] .
An important underlying structure of a QCC is circulant matrices. Circulant matrices are a building block of quasi-cyclic codes.
Definition 4.1. Circulant matrix: An n × n matrix C ′ over a field F is called circulant if every row, except for the first row, is a circular right shift of the row above that.
It is known that a circulant matrix can be represented by its first row, as a polynomial of degree n − 1 over the ring F [x]/(x n − 1). In this paper, we define the multiplicity of a field element a in C ′ as the number of times it appear in the first row of C ′ . Multiplicity can be zero. For more on circulant matrices we refer to Davis [6] .
Conditions on the parity-check matrix
We need some terminology before we can describe our requirements on parity-check matrices of a quasi-cyclic codes. These condition are easy to generate and a large class of block circulant matrices satisfy these conditions. Similarly, if there is a permutation τ ∈ S n such that τ (r i ) = r j , we say that rows r i and r j are permutation equivalent.
In short, two columns are permutation equivalent if one of them can can be reordered to get the other column. We now describe the quasi-cyclic code for our cryptosystem. We do this by stating conditions on the systematic parity-check matrix H for a error-correcting code over F 2 η . The dimension of H is m 1 p × m 2 p, where m 1 < m 2 are positive integers and p a prime. Furthermore, H is of the form [I|C] where I is an identity matrix of size m 1 p × (m 2 − m 1 )p and C is a block-circulant matrix. Each block in C, is a circulant matrix C ij where i = 1, 2, . . . , m 1 and j = 1, 2, . . . , (m 2 − m 1 ) and is of size the prime p. It is well known that C = i E i,j ⊗ C i,j where E ij is the matrix of same size as C with 1 in the (i j) position and zero everywhere else. i) Circulant matrices C ij with all entries the same is forbidden. That means, C i,j is such that the polynomial corresponding to the circulant matrix C i,j is not a k µ k for any a in the field.
ii) For each j there is at least one i where C i,j contain an element from an proper extension of F 2 . This condition is equivalent to saying that each column of C contains at least one element from some non-trivial extension of F 2 .
iii) Any two rows r i , r j in C are permutation equivalent only when
Note that if i p = j p then rows r i , r j and columns c i , c j are permutation equivalent because C i,j is a circulant matrix. So this condition simply says that apart from these permutation equivalences, there are no other permutation equivalence between columns or rows.
iv) There exists at least one C i,j for which corresponding polynomial is not a k =k 0 µ k + bµ k 0 , which is a matrix with two distinct entries a, b where a has multiplicity p − 1 and b has multiplicity one.
v) The prime p > 30.
Remark: Condition (iii) can be alternatively stated as there exists a ∈ F 2 η , such that, the multiplicity of a in r i is not the same as in r j where i p = j p . Equivalence of these two conditions follows directly as two rows are permutation equivalent if and only if one of them can be reordered to the other. Note that this equivalent condition of permutation equivalence is helpful in finding suitable C. This is because, if two rows are permutation equivalent, one can just count multiplicities rather that going through all possible permutations or, in other words, suitably create the rows so that the multiplicities are different. This says that there are a lot of such block-circulant matrices C.
From K to H
Recall from Equation (3), G = GL k (F 2 ) × S n and we are trying to solve the hidden subgroup problem in the group G 2 ⋊ Z 2 . The subgroup in this case is K = K 0 K 1 where K 0 = H, s −1 Hs , 0 and K 1 = Hs, s −1 H , 1 . Note that H replaces H 0 in Equation (3), K 1 is not a subgroup and the union is disjoint.
In this section, we reduce distinguishability of K, D K to the subgroup H. If we directly apply Equation (2), our optimization should be over (GL k (F 2 ) × S n ) 2 ⋊ Z 2 . We reduce it to H, a subgroup of GL k (F 2 ) × S n . Then the later bound can be trivially decomposed into individual components GL k (F 2 ) and S n . Apart from getting rid of the Z 2 component it also serves one more, the most important purpose for further optimization. The bound that we develop are in terms of H. It has no shift term s. It is part of a subgroup H and has connections and structural properties that we exploit for our optimization.
Back to some more notations. Let x G denote the conjugacy class of x in G and C G (x) denotes the centralizer of x in G. Here the group acts on itself by conjugation. We abuse the notation slightly and use e for the identity element in a group. It should be clear from the context which group we are referring to.
From [17, Proposition 1 (2)] we know that
Let S 0 be the sum over K 0 and S 1 be the sum over K 1 in the above expression. We present an upper bound for D K by restricting our action on S 0 and S 1 . First we start with S 1 . By the orbit-stabilizer property S 1 can be rewritten as
(4)
Now we compute an upper bound of C G 2 ⋊Z 2 (k 1 ). Let us define sets G 0 , G 1 , two disjoint subsets of the group G.
This result is a simple calculation using the fact that k 1 commutes with g 0 . After fixing (A 0 , P 0 ) and h 1 , there is at most one choice available for (A 1 , P 1 ). Thus
Similarly, writing a particular commuting equation for k 1 to g 1 we get, h 1 s (A 1 , P 1 ) = (A 0 , P 0 ) s −1 h 2 . In this case,
Combining Equations (5) and (6), we get |C
Putting together above calculations along with |K 1 | = |H| 2 , we get
Similar computation for g 0 ∈ C G 0 (k 0 ) leads us to two conditions:
Thus, there is an upper bound of C G 0 (k 0 ) by |C G (h 1 ) · C G (h 2 )|. Hence,
Similar calculation for C G 1 (k 0 ) gives us the following two conditions:
Thus, there is an upper bound of |C G 1 (k 0 )| by |G| min(C G (h 1 ), C G (h 2 )). Hence,
Combining Equations (8) and (9), we get
Thus,
(10) Again, from orbit-stabilizer theorem,
and thus we have achieved our goal for this section of writing D K in terms H. In particular, this can be done by putting multiplicative overhead for |H| and an additive term given by Equation (7).
5 Size and minimal degree of H Note that in the previous section, we have boiled down the indistinguishability of K to conjugacy classes of H. Similar to the work of Kempe and Shalev [18] , minimal degree and size of the subgroup play an important role in showing indistinguishability of K. In this section, we give an upper bound on the size of H and the lower bound on minimal degrees. Before that, we recall some well known definitions.
Definition 5.1. For any group G ≤ G 1 × G 2 we define Π i (G) as projection of the group G on G i for i = 1, 2.
Definition 5.2. Let M k,n be the ring of k × n matrix. Then there is a natural group action of S k × S n on M k,n given by (P 1 , P 2 )M = P −1 1 M P 2 . Let Stab(C) be the stabilizer of C. Furthermore, T C := Π 1 (Stab(C) ).
The main theorem for this section is the following: To prove the above theorem, the key lemma needed is following:
(weak) Subgroup Decomposition Lemma. Let H be a parity-check matrix such that it satisfies conditions from Section 4.1 then T C ֒→ S p ×S p ×· · ·×S p ×AGL(F p )×S p ×· · · S p . The direct product is taken m 1 − 1 terms of S p and one term of affine general linear group.
This establishes upper and lower bounds on the size and the minimal degree of T C respectively. Later, we will translate this to that of H. We prove the above theorem by a series of lemmas.
where P 1 ∈ S k and P 2 ∈ S n−k . Moreover, P 1 CP 2 = C and for each P 1 there is an unique P 2 . It then follows, T C = Π 1 (H) and |T C | = |H|.
Proof. Let (A, P ) ∈ H then by definition we have
Since action of right multiplication by P is equivalent to reordering of columns we infer that [A|AC] and [I|C] have same columns possibly reordered. By construction (in particular condition (ii) in Section 4.1), C and the identity matrix I have no common columns as every column of C contains an element from proper extension. As C and I have distinct columns; A should have same columns as the identity matrix I. So by the action of multiplication by P first k columns must go to themselves, in other words, first k columns make up a permutation matrix of size k. Hence P is block diagonal matrix, having a block of size k and n − k where each of the blocks is a permutation matrix of size k and n − k respectively, we get P = σ k ⊕ σ n−k . Now Aσ k = I gives A = P 1 and P = A −1 ⊕ P 2 where P 1 = σ k −1 and P 2 = σ n−k . It is easy to see from the fact H = [I|C] that P 1 CP 2 = C.
Clearly, T C = Π 1 (H) as T C being a subgroup, it is closed under inverse. Now, to show uniqueness of P 2 for every P 1 , it suffices to prove for every P 1 there is at most one P 2 . This follows from P 1 CP 2 = C because no two columns of C are identical and so no two columns of P 1 C are identical. Now P 2 should reorder the columns to give back C which can be done at most in one way. Hence, for every P 1 there is at most one corresponding P 2 . Now we move to find an upper bound for the size of H by embedding it into direct product of m 1 affine general linear group over F p . Lemma 5.3. If (P, Q) ∈ Stab(C) then P = i E i,i ⊗ P i and Q = j E j,j ⊗ Q j where P i and Q j are permutation matrices of size p.
Proof. Note that the lemma simply says that all P ∈ Π 1 (Stab(C)) and all Q ∈ Π 2 (Stab(C)) are block diagonal matrices with blocks of size p. We prove the decomposition of Q, similar result for P can be achieved by similar arguments.
Suppose there exists a Q ∈ Π 2 (Stab(C)) that can not be decomposed into the block diagonal form. Then there is some i,j such that Q(i) = j and j p = i p (corresponding to off block diagonal entry at P 2 (i, j)). Now by condition (iii) on C, c i and c j are not permutation equivalent. And thus i th column of CQ and i th column of C are not permutation equivalent. Thus for any P , the i th column of P CQ can not be equal to i th column of C. Thus for any permutation P , P CQ = C. Which leads to a contradiction.
Proof. By the decomposition above, it follows that for every i, j, we have P C i,j Q = C i,j .
The canonical map sending P → (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , . . . , P m 1 ) gives the required inclusion.
Remark 5.1. Note that until now, we have used conditions ii) and iii). So, for any C satisfying those conditions, Lemma 5.4 is valid.
To move further we need a theorem from the theory of permutation groups [8, Section 3.5]. The proof of this theorem requires the classification of finite simple groups. (c) One of the Mathieu groups M 11 or M 23 of degree 11 or 23, respectively.
Now we apply this theorem on a particular choice of T C ir i . The idea here is to choose a r i for each i, such that, T C ir i as described in the Lemma 5.4 can not be (a), (c) or (d). Note that T C ir i are transitive because they contain the cycle (1 2 3 . . . p), only choice left is a subgroup of the affine group.
Lemma 5.6. Let C ′ be a circulant matrix of size p over a field F described by condition iv) of Section 4.1 (that is C ′ is neither a k x k nor bx k 0 + i =k 0 ax i ) then T C ′ is neither S p nor A p .
Proof. Consider group Z p ×S p acting on the set of polynomials from the ring F [x]/(x p −1). We want to compute a lower bound for the orbit of this action for a polynomial from the circulant matrix. The action is as follows:
Notice that if P ∈ T C ′ then P should take the first column of C ′ , denoted by c ′ to some column of C ′ , say column c ′′ . Since C ′ is a circulant matrix, c ′ = j c ′ j x j for c ′ j ∈ F . Now the polynomial for the column c ′′ is c ′ x k mod (x p − 1) for some k in Z p . Thus (−k, P ) is in the stabilizer of c ′ in the above action. Now for C ′ satisfying condition (iv), the orbit of c ′ , the first column of C ′ is at least 3p. This can be seen in the following way:
First notice that if c is any column matrix of size p that is permutation equivalent to c ′ then c is in the orbit of c ′ . Thus every possible reordering of c ′ is also in the orbit. Let m f denote the number of times of occurrence of f in c ′ . Then the number of such possible re-orderings is given by p! f ∈c ′ m f ! . This is less than 3p only in cases where the number of occurrences are of the form m a = p, m b = 0 for all b = a or m b = 1, m a = p − 1, m c = 0 for all c = a, b which are precisely the cases forbidden by condition (iv).
Thus
Thus, T C ′ is neither S p nor A p .
Lemma 5.7. The group T C ′ for a circulant matrix C ′ of size a prime p ≥ 30 is a subgroup of the affine group.
Proof. Since T C ′ can not be S p or A p , the other possible groups are either Matheiu groups M 11 , M 23 or a subgroups of P ΓL d (q). These groups can not have an element of order p for p ≥ 30. But the map x → x + 1 is the cycle (1 2 3 . . . p) and is an element of order p in T C ′ . Thus T C ′ must be a subgroup of the affine group.
So, the required decomposition T C ֒→ S p × S p × . . . × S p × AGL(F p ) × S p × . . . × S p follows. Now we are in a position to reach the main theorem using condition (i).
Lemma 5.8. If a circulant matrix C ′ of size a prime p over a field F that follows condition (i), that is its polynomial representation is other than a i x i then no two columns of C ′ are identical.
Proof. Let g(x) denote the polynomial for circulant C ′ such that two columns that are identical. Then for some k 1 = k 2 , x k 1 g(x) = x k 2 g(x). Consider group action of Z p on ring
x p −1 . Now (k 2 − k 1 ) ∈ Stab(g(x)). As only non-identity of subgroup of Z p is itself we get that Stab(g(x)) is whole of Z p which is possible only for circulant matrices of polynomials a k x k .
One can similarly prove that for such C ′ no two rows are identical. Lemma 5.9. Let C ij be matrices as in condition (i). For all i, j we have, for every P there is at most one solution Q such that P C i,j Q = C i,j . Similarly, for each Q there is at most one P such that P C i,j Q = C i,j .
Proof. Since no two columns of C i,j are identical after action of P , no two columns of P C i,j are identical and then there is unique Q that can reorder columns to get back C i,j . Similar row argument proves the unique P .
Lemma 5.10. Let P 1 , P 2 ∈ T c under decomposition P 1 = (P 11 , P 12 , . . . P 1m 1 ) and P 2 = (P 21 , P 22 , . . . , P 2m 2 ). Then for any i, P 1i = P 2i .
Proof. Suppose there exists i 0 such that P 1i 0 = P 2i 0 . Now for any j, P 1i 0 C i 0 j Q 1j = P 2i 0 C i 0 j Q 2j = C i 0 j for some permutation matrices Q 1j , Q 2j . By Lemma 5.9 on C ′ = C i 0 j there is an unique solution Q, we get Q 1j = Q 2j . Again applying Lemma 5.9 on C ij there is an unique solution P and we get P 1i = P 2i for any i. Thus we have proved that if for some i 0 , P 1i 0 = P 2 i 0 then for all i, P 1i = P 2i making P 1 = P 2 .
Note, this means that there is an injective mapping from the group T C to the group T C ir i for any component in the above decomposition. In particular, if we choose C ir i as a matrix satisfying condition (iv) then that corresponding component is the affine general linear group. Thus we get that |T C | ≤ |T C ′ | ≤ p 2 .
Corollary 5.11. The minimal degree of Π 1 (H) and Π 2 (H) is at least p − 1.
Proof. Clearly, from T C = Π 1 (H) in lemma 5.2, we get the minimal degree of Π 1 (H) to be at least p − 1. Because, non-identity elements of T C must be non-identity in affine component of the direct product decomposition (by Lemma 5.10). Moreover, non-identity elements of an affine group can not fix more than one element. So, the minimal degree of T C = Π 1 (H) is at least p − 1. For minimal degree of Π 2 (H) we show that the minimal degree of Π 2 (H) is at least as large as that of Π 1 (H). Note that, if P 1 ⊕ P 2 ∈ Π 2 (H) is a non-identity element then P 1 = I. This follows from the uniqueness of P 2 in Lemma 5.2. Now, the non-identity element P 1 has support of at least the size of the minimal degree of Π 1 (H) as it is also an element of Π 1 (H).
Thus minimal degree of Π 2 (H) is greater than or equal the minimal degree of Π 1 (H) ≥ p − 1.
Subgroup K is indistinguishable
In this section, we club the results from last section on bounds on projectors of H into Equation (3) to show that K is indistinguishable. Recall that G = GL k (F 2 ) × S n and H = {(A, P ) : AHP = H}. Now from the discussion in previous section, we know that A is a permutation matrix.
Let h = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) ∈ H. Then
for some constant a k ≥ 0. Similarly we can get an upper bound for the other sum. Thus, we have
where δ 1 , δ 2 are minimal degrees of Π 1 (H) and Π 2 (H). Putting this in Equation (13), we get
Proof of Theorem A. To prove K is indistinguishable, we need to show that D K ≤ log(|G 2 ⋊ Z 2 |) −c for every positive constant c.
From Equation (12), it suffices to prove that,
Putting |H| ≤ p 2 , δ 1 , δ 2 ≥ p − 1 and Equation (14) one can verify that above term is less than log(∆ c ) for large enough p. This completes our proof of indistinguishability of the subgroup K, making the cryptosystem resistant to hidden subgroup attacks.
A variation
In this section we show indistinguishability of the hidden subgroup for a class of quasicyclic codes that is slightly different from the one defined by conditions in Section 4.1. This serves two purposes. One, it shows that the class of quasi-cyclic codes can be further extended and two, it shows robustness and adaptability of our proof.
In particular, we show a way to relax condition i) from Section 4.1. We replace two conditions, which are the following:
iv ′ ) For every i there exists a j such that the polynomial for C i,j is neither a i x i nor bx k 0 + a i =k 0 x i .
Note the trade-off between conditions i) and iv) from our previous set. Condition i) is relaxed from for all i, j to at least one j for every i; whereas condition iv) was needed for at least one i, j and now it is tightened to at least one j for every i. Conditions ii) and iii) carry forward as they were while condition i ′ ) is required to ensure that the size of |H| does not blow-up. As before, we need a key lemma.
(strong) Subgroup Decomposition Lemma. Let H = [I|C] be a parity-check matrix, such that, it satisfies conditions i ′ ), ii), iii), iv ′ ) and v) then T C ֒→ AGL(F p ) × AGL(F p ) × . . . × AGL(F p ). Direct product is taken m 1 times.
Proof. First note that since conditions ii) and iii) are still satisfied, (ref. Remark 5.1) Lemma 5.4 holds. Moreover for each i, we can choose C ir i = C ij that satisfies condition (iv ′ ), in particular, matrices other than given by a k x k or bx k 0 + i =k 0 ax i . Now for these matrices T C ir i is neither S p or A p . Now by similar argument to Lemma 5.7 we get that every T C ir i must be a subgroup of the affine group and we get the required subgroup decomposition.
This gives an upper bound on the size of H, as |H| = |T C | ≤ p 2m 1 , and the minimal degree of Π 1 (H) is bounded by p − 1 since at least one of the components must be a non-identity for a non-identity element of T C . This makes minimal degree at least p − 1. Now the minimal degree of Π 2 (H) is greater than or equal to Π 1 (H) by reasoning similar to Corollary 5.11. Now putting these bounds of |H| ≤ p 2m 1 and minimal degree of Π 2 (H) greater than minimal degree of Π 1 (H) ≥ p − 1, one can see that with an additional condition (i ′ ) m 1 = o(p), the subgroup K is indistinguishable from the identity subgroup.
Conclusion
Niederreiter cryptosystems using quasi-cyclic codes are popular these days. The main reason behind this interest is quantum-security. This makes it a good candidate for postquantum cryptography. This is evident from the NIST submissions [4, 30] .
Historically speaking, post-quantum cryptography grew out of Shor's algorithm to factor integers which was later generalized to the discrete logarithm problem. These algorithms use the hidden subgroup problem in finite abelian groups. This hidden subgroup problem has a natural analog, the scrambler-permutation problem, in the noncommutative situation using characters of irreducible representations of the group. If this hidden subgroup is indistinguishable by the quantum Fourier sampling then we can not solve the corresponding scrambler-permutation problem. This makes Niederreiter cryptosystem quantum secure. The idea behind the hidden subgroup problem for Niederreiter cryptosystem was put forward by Dinh et. al. [7] and the idea of distinguishability of subgroups was put forward by Kempe and Shalev [18] .
We prove that for a Niederreiter cryptosystem using quasi-cyclic codes, satisfying certain conditions, the corresponding hidden subgroup is indistinguishable from the identity subgroup by quantum Fourier sampling. This analysis is particularly relevant for the recent NIST submissions in post-quantum cryptography [4, 30] .
